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Bankruptcy judges routinely enjoin debt and equity trading during
Chapter 11 proceedings in order to protect bankrupt corporations' net
operating loss (NOL) tax credits. These credits disappear if a corporation
changes ownership. Firms and judges reason that Chapter 11's automatic stay
prohibits any trading that would imperil NOL credits by causing a change in
ownership. The automatic stay protects a debtor corporation 's assets, and
firms and judges argue that tax credits are assets protected by the stay. At first
glance, this argument makes sense. However, a deeper analysis reveals serious
legal and policy concerns with trading injunctions in Chapter 11. Prohibiting
trading is an extreme step that lacks a clear foundation in previous legislative
and judicial treatment of the automatic stay. In addition to imposing costs on
shareholders and debtholders in a bankrupt corporation, trading injunctions
provide a debtor corporation's management with a powerful-and potentially
coercive-tool to entrench its position. Furthermore, NOL credits for
reorganized corporations make little sense from a tax policy perspective: NOL
credits are meant to offset profits from the project that created the losses, but
reorganized corporations use NOL credits to offset gains from reorganization.
This Note critiques the treatment of NOLs during Chapter 11 from both
bankruptcy and tax angles. Thus far, there has been almost no policy
conversation surrounding NOLs in bankruptcy. After illustrating the problems
with the current policy, this Note suggests several original solutions and
evaluates these alternate policies.
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Introduction
Since the 1990s, bankruptcy judges have routinely issued injunctions
halting trading in equity and debt during Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.'
Corporations typically request these injunctions on the day they file for
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected, 2015. Thanks to Professor Yair Listokin for
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1. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS S.S. Co. (In re Prudential
Lines Inc.), 928 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Northwest Airlines, Case No. 05-17930 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2005); In re Delta Air Lines, Case No. 05-17923 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2005);
In re Mirant Corp., Case No. 03-46590 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 22, 2003); In re WorldCom, Case No.
02-13533 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2003); In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 152 B.R. 924, 927 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1993). Often, injunctions do not freeze all trading but instead prohibit only those trades that would




bankruptcy, including them in the package of "first-day motions" that judges
often quickly approve.2 Firms justify these requests by pointing out that debt
and equity trading, if it triggers a "change in ownership" as defined by the
Internal Revenue Code, threatens net operating loss (NOL) carryovers.3 These
tax credits, which are based on losses the corporation incurred in previous
years, disappear if the corporation changes ownership.' Judges are generally
convinced that carryovers are assets of the debtor estate and thus need to be
protected through trading injunctions.'
At first glance, this argument makes sense. Carryovers can be immensely
valuable: major corporations in Chapter 11 may have accumulated billions of
dollars in NOLs. 6 If a corporation can deduct these losses from post-
reorganization profits, the benefit to shareholders may be enormous. These
shareholders-who may be the current creditors in a Chapter 11 case7-need
the bankruptcy judge's help to ensure that the corporation's assets, including
its tax credits, do not diminish over the course of Chapter 11 proceedings.
Indeed, the central purpose of Chapter 11 is to protect the debtor's value
against collective action issues like individual investors' rush to dismember the
debtor corporation in financial distress.
Upon closer examination, however, this standard Chapter 11 logic may
not apply to NOL carryovers. Even if a corporation emerges from Chapter 11
and generates enough profits to use its carryovers-which is not necessarily the
case-the rationale for issuing an injunction to'protect the tax credits is
questionable. First, the potential benefits of preserving the credits may not
justify the significant costs that can result from a trading freeze: halting trading
denies stakeholders valuable liquidity and may inhibit productive negotiations
by trapping parties in their current ownership roles. Furthermore, an
examination of the broad policy justification for carryovers reveals that
maintaining carryovers in reorganized companies is not productive tax policy
and may produce perverse incentives. Injunctions also give management an
opportunity to freeze trading purely to prevent takeovers and remain in control.
Finally, the legal foundation for trading injunctions is not as strongly rooted in
the Bankruptcy Code as the judges and attorneys supporting these injunctions
try to make it seem.
2. See, e.g., Jean Morris, Imposition of Transfer Limitations on Claims and Equity
Interests During Corporate Debtor's Chapter 11 Case to Preserve the Debtor's NOL Carryforward:
Examining the Emerging Trend, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 285, 288 (2003).
3. See I.R.C. § 382(h)(5) (Supp. 2009). I have used the general term "carryover" in
this Note instead of the more specific "carryforward," which is the sort of credit generally at issue. I
chose this approach because not all sources use the specific term consistently.
4. See I.R.C. § 382(a) (Supp. 2009).
5. See, e.g., In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 152 B.R. at 927.
6. See, e.g., In re UAL Corp., 412 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 2005).
7. In many Chapter 11 reorganizations, existing equity is wiped out or reduced and
creditors receive new equity in exchange for their debt.
8. If investors dismember a corporation by seizing collateral when the corporation
appears distressed, going-concern value may be lost.
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This Note examines these problems with NOL carryovers and the Chapter
11 injunctions that judges ostensibly use to protect them. Part I provides
general background on carryovers. It begins by articulating a policy foundation
for carryovers: without them, the annual tax period threatens to drive a wedge
between private and social rates of return for some projects,9 discouraging
some projects with positive net present values. The NOL carryover fixes this
problem, but it is only effective if it is used to offset profits generated by the
project that created the initial losses. After Congress introduced carryovers in
1918, corporations realized they could endow carryovers with independent
value by merging with profitable corporations and using those loss carryovers
to offset the profits. Starting in the 1930s, Congress and the courts responded
by setting up a framework of limitations on carryovers when a corporation
undergoes a change in ownership. The 1986 Tax Code provided a threshold to
determine a change in ownership, and 2013 IRS regulations raised this
threshold. Part II covers the treatment of carryovers during bankruptcy: the
Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 specifically addressed carryovers in the Chapter
11 context, providing exceptions that allow corporations to retain carryovers
even when a reorganization would otherwise trigger a change in ownership.
Part III identifies and evaluates critiques of the current approach to
carryovers. This Part provides both legal and policy-based critiques of trading
injunctions. Legal questions include whether carryovers are property of the
debtor estate, whether the automatic stay should protect them, 10 whether
judges' broader equitable powers can support injunctions, and whether
injunctions violate the Fifth Amendment. Policy analysis suggests that the
situation that justifies carryovers-namely, using losses to offset future profits
directly generated by the same project-may be so rare in Chapter 11 that
protecting NOLs has almost no basis in sound policy. Reorganization nearly
always allows corporations to use carryovers to offset profits that do not
directly result from the original corporation's project." In addition to resting
on questionable policy, trading freezes have immense costs and do not preserve
carryovers indefinitely, since they do not typically persist after confirmation of
a reorganization plan. 12 Injunctions also provide a bankrupt corporation's
management with an anchor it can use to preserve its power.
Part IV proposes several solutions to the problems with the current
treatment of carryovers. None is a perfect fix or fully achieves the policy
9. "Projects" as used in this Note simply refers to whatever business pursuits generate
NOLs.
10. The automatic stay is an automatic injunction that prevents creditors from
asserting claims against debtor assets during a bankruptcy proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
11. See infra Part III.B.l.
12. However, the combination of injunctions and other aspects of bankruptcy law
allows corporations to avoid losing NOLs by virtue of a reorganization, which makes it more likely that




objectives of carryovers. All of the proposed strategies, however, would be
preferable to the current system.
I. Congressional and Judicial Treatment of NOLs
A. Original Recognition ofNet Loss Carryovers
The NOL carryover dates back to the Revenue Act of .1918, which
allowed a one-year carryback13 and a one-year carryforward of losses.14 The
justification for these provisions was simple: Congress wanted to eliminate the
arbitrary impact of the annual tax period.15 Lawmakers were concerned with
the "harshness" of this annual system and its disparate impacts on corporations
with steady incomes versus those with fluctuating incomes. 6 Without
carryovers, a firm that makes $20 million one year and loses $10 million the
next would owe twice as much in taxes as a firm that makes $5 million each
year, even though the two firms generate the same total profits. 7 With this in
mind, Congress chose a policy that appeared more equitable to different types
of taxpayers.
Broader efficiency considerations bolster the argument for NOL
carryovers. Without carryovers, taxpayers may offset profits only with losses
incurred during the same year. This accounting treatment discourages some
projects with positive net present values: it taxes future revenue without
offering any mitigating credit for losses in a different period. As an illustration,
imagine a corporation that can generate profit of $100 million next year if it
operates at a net loss of $80 million this year. If the discount rate is two
percent, this project has a net present value of $18.04 million.19 However, if the
corporate tax rate is 30% and the tax code does not allow carryovers, the
corporation will reject the project: the project's net present value to the
corporation is -$11.4 million.20 If the corporation could use its $80 million loss
this year to offset its profit next year, however, the project would offer a
positive internal rate of return.21 The corporation then would be taxed on only
13 . A carryback offsets profits from a previous year with current losses; a
carryforward offsets current profits with losses from a previous year.
14. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 204(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1061 (1919)
(current version at I.R.C. § 172 (Supp. 2009)).
15. See H.R. REP. NO. 65-617 (1919).
16. See Daniel L. Simmons, NOLs and Section 382: Searching for a Limitation on
Loss Carryovers, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1045, 1051 (1989).
17. This assumes a flat corporate tax rate.
18. See H.R. REP. NO. 65-617.
19. (100/1.02) - 80 = 18.04.
20. [{l00x(1 -0.3)}/1.02] - 80= -11.4.
21. Net present value is the difference between the present value of cash inflows and
the present value of cash outflows. The internal rate of return of a project is the discount rate that makes
the net present value of cash flows from the project equal to zero. Due to capital constraints,
corporations will not invest in every project with a positive internal rate of return. Still, carryovers
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$20 million of its profit next year, producing a positive present value of $12.16
million.2 2 Thus, the NOL carryover makes projects with overall positive net
present values profitable to corporations: it removes the wedge that the annual
tax period drives between private and social rates of return.
This analysis supports Congress's "averaging" rationale for carryovers:
smoothing out profits and losses over multiple years internalizes the value of a
project.23 However, the averaging justification depends on the assumption that
the taxpayer benefiting from the carryover is the same one that incurred the
losses: compensating one corporation for another's losses does not improve
incentives. Corporations quickly undermined this justification. As soon as
Congress instituted carryovers, corporations realized that the carryovers could
be tradable assets.24 Loss corporations25 might never generate enough profit to
take advantage of their tax credits, but these credits could be immensely
valuable if transferred to a profitable corporation.26 Profitable corporations
began acquiring loss corporations purely to offset profit with the loss
corporations' NOLs.2 7 This practice entirely derailed the policy justification for
carryovers. It created a perverse incentive: it subsidized corporations for loss
projects that never generated aprofit.
When losses result in corporate assets, corporations may engage in risky
projects with negative expected values. Consider, for instance, a corporation
that can pursue a project that offers a 50% chance of an $80 million gain and a
50% chance of a $100 million loss. This project has an expected return of-$10
million. 2 8 Assume that the corporate tax rate is 30%. In a regime in which
buyers can assume all NOLs, the rational corporation will pursue this project.
If the project fails, the corporation will have $100 million in NOLs, which are
worth $30 million to a profitable corporation. In an auction setting, the
corporation can sell itself for this amount, giving the project an ex ante
expected value of $5 million to the firm. 2 9 Tradable NOLs thus generate an
inefficiency: corporations have an incentive to make losing bets when their
losses are valuable to others.
prevent the one-year tax period from causing positive-net-present-value projects to have a negative
internal rate of return.
22. [{20x(1 - 0.3) + 80}/1.02] - 80 = 12.16.
23. Congress continually expanded the period in which corporations can offset
profits: the most recent version of the Internal Revenue Code extends carryovers for twenty years and
carrybacks for two years. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2009).
24. Michelle M. Arnopol, Why Have Chapter 11 Bankruptcies Failed So Miserably?
A Reappraisal of Congressional Attempts to Protect a Corporation's NOLs After Bankruptcy, 68
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 133, 139 (1992).
25. The IRS defines a "loss corporation" as a corporation that has a NOL in a given
year or is entitled to use a NOL carryover. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.382-2(a)(1)(i) (2010).
26. See Arnopol, supra note 24, at 139.
27. Id.
28. 80x0.5 + (-100)xO.5 = -10.




B. Judicial Intervention Limiting the Transferability ofNOLs
By the 1930s, courts recognized this incentive problem and searched for a
remedy. In Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose,30 the Supreme Court established a
limit on the transferability of NOLs. 3' Woolford involved the situation
envisioned above: a profitable corporation acquired a loss corporation and used
the NOLs to offset the profitable corporation's income, insisting that the
Revenue Act allowed this practice.32 The Court was not impressed. Justice
Cardozo wrote that Congress could not have intended to allow "mischief'
through "juggling so facile and so obvious."3 ' The Court established the
principle that NOLs could be used only to offset income of the taxpayer that
incurred the losses and never to offset the profits of a corporation that was
separate when the initial corporation generated the losses. 3 Any other
interpretation, Justice Cardozo wrote, would be unreasonable and contrary to
the purpose of the statute.35
The Court soon clarified and expanded the limits on transferability of
carryovers. In New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, shareholders and creditors of
a recently formed corporation negotiated to organize a new company36 after it
became clear that the original business plan would not generate profits.37 These
negotiations produced a plan that involved canceling all outstanding stock and
replacing it with stock in a new corporation that would assume all assets and
liabilities of the old corporation.3 8 The stockholders of the new corporation
were the same as those of the old corporation.3 9 The creditors were also the
same, although they received additional control over the management through
a voting trust.40 Nevertheless, the Court held that the new corporation could not
offset its profits with the old corporation's losses.4 1 It was irrelevant that the
stockholders were the same in the original corporation and the new one
because a corporation and its stockholders are separate entities.4 2 Since the
corporation claiming the NOLs was formally a different corporation from the
30. 286 U.S. 319 (1932).
31. Id. at 328.
32. Id. at 329.
33. Id. at 330.
34. Id.; see also Planters Cotton Oil Co. v. Hopkins, 286 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1932)
(limiting NOL carryovers to the original taxpayer in a substantially similar situation).
35. Woolford Realty, 286 U.S. at 328.
36. The role of NOLs in this contractual effort to reorganize to an insolvent business
provides an early preview of the importance of NOLs in Chapter 11.
37. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 438 (1934), superseded by




41. Id. at 442.
42. Id.; cf Alprosa Watch Corp. v. Comm'r, II T.C. 240, 246 (1948) (holding that
transfer of stock does not make a corporation a new taxpayer since a corporation is a separate entity
from its stockholders).
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one that created them, it was by definition a separate taxpayer and was not
entitled to these benefits.4 3 The Court thus held that maintenance of carryovers
depended entirely on a corporation's formal structure.
Ironically, this elevation of form over substance provided a foundation for
widespread protection of carryovers in mergers. Lower courts treated Woolford
and New Colonial Ice as if they prohibited only NOL transfers that took certain
specific forms: the cases clearly prohibited the use of a carryover that a
profitable corporation acquired when it bought a loss corporation, and they also
prohibited the use of a carryover after explicit changes in corporate identity."
Corporations argued that a large loophole remained: a profitable corporation
could merge into a loss corporation and assume its carryovers so long as the
merger formally left the loss corporation as the surviving corporate entity.45 in
Helvering v. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co.,46 the Supreme Court endorsed
this loophole, holding that the surviving corporate entity in a merger is the
same taxpayer as both of the pre-merger corporations.7 While this holding
seems contrary to Woolford, the Court did not explicitly refer to Woolford in
Pennsylvania Water. The cases are distinguishable in that the tax benefits in
Pennsylvania Water were unamortized bond discounts that arose from debt
assumed in the merger.48 The Court may have been drawing a distinction
between incidental transfer of tax benefits in the course of a legitimate merger
and deliberate purchase of net losses. However, many lower courts used
Pennsylvania Water to open the floodgates for NOL transfers in mergers in
general.49
Lower courts likewise interpreted New Colonial Ice to allow transfer of
tax benefits so long as firms maintained the legal fiction of a continuous
entity.50 In Alprosa Watch Corp. v. Commissioner, for example, the Tax Court
treated a corporation as the same legal entity for tax purposes even when its
ownership, name, and area of business changed entirely.51 The Tax Court thus
expanded on the formalism of New Colonial Ice. In New Colonial Ice,
continuity of ownership and business plan was not enough to preserve tax
43. New Colonial Ice, 292 U.S. at 441-42.
44. Arnopol, supra note 24, at 141; see also Michael L. Schultz, Section 382 and the
Pursuit ofNeutrality in the Treatment ofNOL Carryovers, 39 KAN. L. REv. 59, 63 (1990) (claiming that
courts interpreted New Colonial Ice to allow transfers of NOL carryovers "as long as the transaction
took the proper legal form").
45. Arnopol, supra note 24, at 141.
46. 306 U.S. 522, 529 (1939).
47. Arnopol, supra note 24, at 141.
48. Pennsylvania Water, 306 U.S. at 525.
49. Arnopol, supra note 24, at 141. Lower courts split on this issue, but many allowed
the transfer of tax attributes in broad contexts. See, e.g., Old Nat'l Bank in Evansville v. Comm'r, 256
F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 1958); Adrian & James, Inc. v. Comm'r, 4 T.C. 708, 720 (1945). But see Jones
v. Noble Drilling Co., 135 F.2d 721, 724 (10th Cir. 1943).
50. Amopol, supra note 24, at 142.




benefits when corporate form changed. 52 In Alprosa Watch, continuous
corporate form was the only requirement o establish taxpayer continuity.
The Supreme Court entered the fray again in 1957 and provided more
concrete limits on the transferability of NOLs. In Libson Shops, Inc. v.
Koehler,54 a successor corporation i  a merger relied on Pennsylvania Water to
claim NOLs from several pre-merger corporations. The IRS argued that New
Colonial Ice limited carryovers to the pre-merger corporation that created the
losses.56 The Court did not explicitly resolve the tension between these cases;
rather, it established a new test.5 7 Returning to the basic justification for
carryovers, the Court held that the successor corporation could not deduct the
losses because the business that would otherwise benefit from the deduction
was not engaged in the same enterprise as the corporation that sustained the
losses. ' "Continuity of business enterprise" was essential to carryovers'
fundamental purpose: the carryovers were designed not to become arbitrary tax
assets but to permit averaging of a business's profits and losses over a period
longer than one year.59 The Court thus rejected the formalism and bright-line
tests that lower courts had drawn from Woolford, New Colonial Ice, and
Pennsylvania Water. Instead, it indicated that courts should follow a standard
based on fundamental policy objectives when determining whether to allow
transfers of carryovers.60
C. Statutory Constraints
The Libson Shops standard did not clarify precisely when NOLs would
disappear, and Congress's subsequent attempts at reform failed to develop a
workable framework. After nearly thirty years of confused courts and
ineffective statutes, the American Law Institute proposed an elegant approach
to NOLs: cap a successor corporation's ability to use NOLs at the value of the
loss corporation immediately before the transaction.6 1 If this rule could be
enforced, it would eliminate trafficking in carryovers: no corporation could
52. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 438 (1934), superseded by
statute, I.R.C. § 381(a) (1954).
53. Alprosa Watch, 11 T.C. at 246. The Supreme Court did not address this converse
situation in New Colonial Ice-the Court simply held that continuity of ownership and business
activities did not trump corporate form. New Colonial Ice, 292 U.S. at 438.
54. 353 U.S. 382 (1957). Libson Shops was decided under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939. Id. at 382.




59. Id. at 386.
60. See id. at 389-90.
61. AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS ON
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS AND REPORTER'S STUDY ON CORPORATE
DISTRIBUTIONS 204 (1982).
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gain from another's tax benefits.62 Congress incorporated the proposal into the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. The 1986 Act-which remains largely intact-
limited carryovers after "ownership changes."63 According to the statute, a
corporation experiences an ownership change if the aggregate value of
increases in the stock held by shareholders who each own at least 5% of the
corporation is more than fifty percentage points during a three-year period.64
Under this approach, shareholders who wn less than 5% of the corporation are
deemed to comprise together a "public group," which is effectively a single
five-percent shareholder.65 Transfers of stock among these small shareholders
do not count toward an ownership change, even if a large percentage of the
value of the corporation is so transferred.66 However, certain "segregation
events"-such as the issuance or redemption of stock or the sale of stock by a
five-percent shareholder--can cause a loss corporation to have multiple public
groups.67 Thus, under the 1986 Act, five-percent shareholders can quickly
trigger changes in ownership when they sell stock to smaller shareholders.
2013 IRS regulations-discussed in the next Part-amended the segregation
rules so that sales to small shareholders and small redemptions are generally
not segregation events.68
The 1986 Act caps carryovers if a corporation changes ownership.
Corporations may deduct only losses equal to the value of the loss corporation
at the time of the ownership change multiplied by the long-term, tax-exempt
rate on federal obligations.69 The value of the loss corporation is determined by
the market value of all of its outstanding stock.70 In principle, this statutory
approach should effectively limit carryovers to the amount of income that the
loss corporation could have generated independently, which is consistent with
the policy rationale for carryovers.
62. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
63. I.R.C. § 382 (1986).
64. Thus, to test for a change in ownership, subtract each five-percent shareholder's
lowest percentage held during the testing period from that shareholder's percentage held on the testing
date. Add all the resulting amounts: if the sum is over fifty percentage points, a change in ownership has
occurred. For example, assume that there are two five-percent shareholders on the testing date:
Shareholder A owns 45% of shares by value and Shareholder B owns 25%. If Shareholders A and B
both owned 5% of shares at some point during the testing period, the aggregate increase in value is sixty
percentage points, and a change in ownership has occurred. Non-voting stock is irrelevant. Assets




68. T.D. 9638, 2013-46 I.R.B. 487.
69. The relevant rate is the one in effect when the ownership transaction occurs.
I.R.C. § 382 (1986).
70. Id. Any capital contributions made in the two years prior to the ownership change




D. Recent IRS Reforms
The IRS promulgated rules in 2013 that alter the segregation rules under
Section 382.71 The new rules allow five-percent entities to transfer stock to
small shareholders without creating a new public group. This new policy is a
significant shift. Prior to the new rules, a transfer of stock from a five-percent
entity to small shareholders would create a new public group comprised of
those shareholders. Under the new rules, the transferred stock is treated as
being acquired proportionately by all public groups in existence at he time of
the transfer.72 The new rules also provide an exception to the segregation rules
for small redemptions and a general exception for transfers of stock by five-
percent entities that own less than 10% of the loss corporation's stock.73
The 2013 rules thus raise the change-in-ownership bar for loss
corporations, allowing corporations to maintain NOLs in the midst of more
stock transactions. Taxpayers welcomed the new rules.74 It is too early to
analyze judges' reaction to the rules, but it seems likely that the rules will lead
to fewer or narrower 5 injunctions. While an end to broad injunctions against
all trading is a plus, the 2013 reform falls far short of fixing the NOL regime.
Many injunctions are issued largely or exclusively to prohibit trades that would
still threaten NOLs under the new rules-the segregation rules are irrelevant
when a new investor acquires 5% of a corporation or an existing shareholder's
stake doubles. Firms can still reasonably request injunctions to prevent trades
not covered by the new rules. The types of trades covered by the new rules are
by definition trades that could never allow outside investors to unseat
management, so management can still use injunctions as an anchor to remain in
power. Most importantly, the recent reforms do nothing to address the
fundamental tax policy problem with NOLs in reorganized corporations: if
anything, the new rules make it more likely that reorganized corporations will
retain NOLs and thus use them to offset gains from reorganization rather than
profits from the project that generated the losses.
II. NOL Carryovers in Chapter 11
Judicial and statutory limitations on NOL carryovers can play a
particularly significant role in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. Since many
corporations file for bankruptcy after sustaining losses, firms often have
sizeable carryovers by the time they enter Chapter 11. Since the reorganization
process offers a chance for a loss corporation to emerge from bankruptcy and
71. T.D. 9638, 2013-46 I.R.B. 487.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., IRS Issues Helpful 'Small Shareholder' Regs Under Section 382,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.pwc.com/enUS/us/washington-national
-tax/newsletters/wnts/assets/pwc-irs-issues-small-shareholder-regs.pdf
75. For example, injunctions that apply to fewer trades. See infra note 133.
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generate profits, carryovers may be immensely valuable. However,
reorganization threatens carryovers under the standard statutory framework: a
significant adjustment of capital structure may trigger a change in ownership.
Noting that this reduces prospects for successful reorganizations, Congress and
the courts created exceptions that allow corporations in Chapter 11 to bypass
the general limitations on carryovers.
A. The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980
The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 addressed NOL carryovers in the
context of Chapter 11 bankruptcy.76 Congress designed several provisions of
the Act to allow reorganized companies to retain pre-bankruptcy carryovers.77
Significantly, the Act classified former creditors as shareholders if their claims
became stock in the course of a reorganization plan.78 Thus, reorganizations
did not trigger the change-in-control limitation by converting debt o equity.
The Act also gave carryovers a prominent role in a reorganization plan's
discharge of debt.80 The IRS typically considers any discharge of debt to be
taxable income.8' The Bankruptcy Tax Act, however, allowed a corporation in
Chapter 11 to deduct discharged debt from its outstanding tax credits instead of
declaring the discharged debt as income.82 The Act ranked tax assets in the
order in which corporations had to use them to absorb discharged debt, and
NOL carryovers were first in this ranking.83 This made carryovers particularly
valuable in Chapter 11 proceedings. It also endowed carryovers with value as
corporate assets that had nothing to do with the future profits that the
corporation might earn.
B. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The 1986 overhaul provided specific guidelines for the transfer of NOLs
in Chapter 11 reorganizations.84 The standard rules outlined above would
typically prevent a reorganized corporation from retaining carryovers: the
value of a corporation's stock immediately before reorganizing in bankruptcy






81. I.R.C. § 108 (Supp. 2013).
82. Discharged debt under this provision did not include any debt that the plan
converted to equity. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 § 2.
83. Id.
84. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 621(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2254




is usually very low.85 However, Congress created two avenues for corporations
in Chapter 11 to preserve carryovers after Chapter 11 reorganizations.
The first route applies if the corporation's original stockholders or
creditors retain at least 50% ownership under the reorganization plan.86 "Fifty
percent ownership" here requires ownership of both 50% of the value of
outstanding stock and 50% of votes.87 Under these conditions, the IRS does not
consider the corporation to have changed ownership.8 Thus, it can retain all of
its carryovers in its reorganized form. 89 To be considered an "original
creditor," a creditor must have held a corporation's debt for more than eighteen
months when the firm files for Chapter 11.90 Without this limitation, investors
could simply purchase all of a corporation's debt and the corporation could
convert it to stock.9' If a corporation meets all of these requirements, it may
maintain its carryovers after educing their value through the use of a specified
formula.92 There is one catch, however: if a corporation elects this approach
and then changes hands again less than two years after the reorganization, all
carryovers disappear.9 3
If a corporation wants to avoid this risk, it can follow a second route: it
can remain under the general rules governing limitations on NOLs and claim a
special exception carved out for bankruptcy.9 4 Under this exception, a bankrupt
firm can base its carryover ceiling on its value immediately after, rather than
immediately before, its ownership change. 9 This can be a tremendous
advantage: if a reorganization plan cancels a large portion of a corporation's
debt, the corporation's equity is likely to be much more valuable immediately
after the plan takes effect.96
85. See Arnopol, supra note 24, at 168.
86. The stockholders of the reorganized corporation must receive their stock in the





90. There is an exception for debts that arise through ordinary business proceedings in
an effort to keep the corporation afloat. Id.
91. [d.
92. A corporation must deduct from its carryovers (1) half the debt discharged in the
stock conversion and (2) the amount of interest paid, during the current taxable year and the three
taxable years before it, on the debt that was converted to stock. See Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1006(d)(18), 102 Stat. 3342, 3398 (codified at I.R.C. §
382(l)(5)(c)).
93. See Simmons, supra note 16, at 1051.
94. See I.R.C. § 382(l)(5) (2012).
95. Id.
96. See Amopol, supra note 24, at 173, for an extensive analysis of the two routes for
dealing with NOL carryovers in bankruptcy and the choice between the two.
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C. Bankruptcy-Specific Judicial Intervention
Congress intended the special provisions for carryovers in bankruptcy to
promote successful reorganizations.97 In a broader sense, however, the reforms
of the 1980s solidified carryovers as assets that had value independent of future
profits. 9' Reorganizing corporations could use carryovers to eliminate
extensive tax liability for discharged debt. 9 Furthermore, the bankruptcy
exceptions in the 1986 Act allowed corporations to change ownership without
triggering a reduction in carryovers.'0 0 Carryovers thus became central to the
reorganization process: in some cases, they became the peg on which a
successful reorganization hung.'0 ' However, there was one significant risk: if
the original stockholders and creditors decided to sell their claims, NOLs might
be gone forever. Firms tried to construct arguments to protect carryovers from
this frightening fate.
In 1991, the Second Circuit provided a foundation for these arguments.
The court in In re Prudential Lines Inc. classified NOL carryovers as property
of a debtor's estate.102 In that case, PSS Steamship Company attempted to
claim a worthless stock deduction'o3 based on its interest in Prudential Lines,
the debtor."' If PSS had claimed this deduction, the debtor would have lost
$74 million in carryovers.05 The court held that the carryover was the property
of the bankruptcy estate and accordingly enjoined PSS from claiming the
deduction.'06 Claiming it, the court reasoned, would violate the automatic stay:
by causing its bankrupt subsidiary to lose a tax asset, PSS would be exercising
control over the debtor's protected property.107
Considering carrybacks to be the debtor's property was not an entirely
new idea. A quarter-century earlier, the Supreme Court had held that a debtor's
NOL carryback was property of the bankruptcy estate.08 In Segal v. Rochelle,
a trustee in a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding acquired tax refunds by
97. See id.
98. See I.R.C. § 382(1)(5) (2012).
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., Arnopol, supra note 24, at 136 ("A financially troubled corporation is
far more likely to reorganize successfully if it can offset its income earned after bankruptcy with its net
operating losses incurred prior to bankruptcy.").
102. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS S.S. Co. (In re Prudential Lines
Inc.), 928 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1991).
103. If a security held as a capital asset becomes worthless, the IRS treats the
resultant decline in value as a capital loss. I.R.C. § 165(g)(1) (2012). This allows the corporation to
deduct a worthless security's decline in value like a loss from selling a security. See I.R.C. § 1211(a)
(2012).
104. Id.
105. Id. The worthless stock deduction would trigger an ownership change under
I.R.C. § 382(g)(4)(d) (2012).
106. Prudential Lines, 928 F.2d at 572.
107. Id.




applying NOLs to profits from previous years.0 9 The owners of the bankrupt
business claimed that these refunds, which resulted from losses incurred prior
to bankruptcy, remained their personal property and did not pass to the
trustee. 110 The Court disagreed: settling a circuit split, ' Justice Harlan
reasoned that the refunds were "property" at the time the bankruptcy petition
was filed, even though they were unclaimed."12 This meant that they belonged
to the debtor, not the owners.'13
In Prudential Lines, the court expanded the Segal holding by applying it
to carryforwards and to Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The court also protected
carryovers more aggressively: rather than simply deciding which party should
receive existing benefits, Prudential Lines endorsed the use of injunctions to
prevent behavior that might jeopardize the carryovers. The court might have
intended this holding to apply only to the specific situation in the case: a parent
corporation effectively competing with its subsidiaries' creditors for a tax
benefit. The Second Circuit likely was also motivated by other concerns
specific to the Prudential Lines situation: PSS's threat to claim the stock
deduction looked dangerously ike a coercive maneuver to force the creditors'
committee to back down and accept management's reorganization plan.114
There is no indication that the court intended to endorse widespread injunctions
in any Chapter 11 case involving NOLs.
Indeed, Prudential Lines did not immediately effect a broad change in
Chapter 11 proceedings. At first, courts declined to apply its logic in other
cases."' Many commentators saw it as a dangerous ruling and criticized its
reasoning.116 Throughout the early 1990s, most debtor corporations did not
seek trading injunctions to protect tax assets. Indeed, the widespread forfeiture
of carryovers during reorganization led some commentators to call for
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code to protect the credits."7 These analysts
109. Id. at 376.
110. Id.
Ill. Compare Segal v. Rochelle, 336 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1964), afTd, 382 U.S. 375,
380 (1966) (holding that carrybacks pass to the bankruptcy estate), with Fournier v. Rosenblum, 318
F.2d 525, 527 (1st Cir. 1963) (holding that loss-carryback refunds do not pass to the bankruptcy
trustee), and In re Sussman, 289 F.2d 76, 77 (3d Cir. 1961) (holding the same as Fournier).
112. Segal, 382 U.S. at 378.
113. Id. The Segal Court explicitly declined to consider whether its reasoning would
apply to carryovers generally. The Court mentioned the practical difference between carrybacks and
carryforwards, pointing out that carryforwards' value depends on "earnings that might never eventuate
at all." Carrybacks, on the other hand, have immediate and precise value. Id. at 381.
114. See Morris, supra note 2, at 288.
115. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of D.F. Antonelli v. United
States (In re Antonelli), 150 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992) (holding that prepetition passive activity
losses are not property of the debtor estate); Morris, supra note 2, at 289.
116. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 2, at 289; CODE REVIEW PROJECT, NAT'L BANKR.
CONFERENCE, REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: FINAL REPORT, at C (1994).
117. See, e.g., Arnopol, supra note 24, at 195 ("If the Chapter 11 goal of successfully
rehabilitating financially troubled corporations is to be realized, section 382 must be amended so that
corporations emerging from bankruptcy can use their pre-bankruptcy net operating losses to shelter their
post-reorganization income from tax.").
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argued that preserving carryovers would promote Chapter Il's fundamental
goals of preserving jobs and going-concern value." 8
They need not have worried about forfeiture of carryovers. By the late
1990s, debtors and their attorneys had incorporated Prudential Lines into their
Chapter 11 negotiation strategies.'9 A request for a trading injunction became
a commonplace feature of the "first-day motions" that attorneys bring before a
bankruptcy judge when filing for Chapter 11.120 At the outset of a bankruptcy
proceeding, debtors request trading injunctions alongside common,
uncontroversial matters, such as permission to continue paying employees and
arrangements for debtor-in-possession financing.12 1 In recent years, courts have
become receptive to this approach and have cited Prudential Lines to defend
rubber-stamping these orders to freeze debt and equity trading.1 2 2 Surprisingly,
this routine practice is rarely contested.12 3 Almost no published opinions have
wrestled with the implications of these broad injunctions. 124
There is one notable exception. During United Airlines' 2002 bankruptcy
proceeding, majority shareholders appealed a trading injunction and sought
damages based on the decline in stock value that occurred while they were not
allowed to trade.125 The Seventh Circuit ultimately held that no remedy was
available,126 but Judge Easterbrook excoriated the bankruptcy judge in dicta for
issuing the injunction.' 2 7 Judge Easterbrook attacked the bankruptcy judge's
reasoning that the injunction would not harm investors given that the stock
market was just as likely to rise as to fall while the injunction was in effect.128
While this statement may be accurate in the sense that, according to the semi-
strong form Efficient Market Hypothesis, all public information about a stock
is incorporated into its current share price, it ignores the independent benefits
of liquidity.1 2 9 Judge Easterbrook observed that investors suddenly held less
118. Id. On the policy goals of Chapter 11, see, for example, H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at
220 (1978); Arnopol, supra note 24, at 134.
119. See Morris, supra note 2, at 285.
120. See, e.g., Max Barker, Claims Trading and the Automatic Stay: Revisiting In Re
Prudential Lines and the Implications for Current Practice, 12 DEL. L. REV. 79, 79 (2010) ("The
growing trend of debtors seeking first day orders pursuant to sections 105(a) and 362(a)(3) restricting
trading in claims has added yet another motion to present to the bankruptcy judge on the first day of a
new case.").
121. See Morris, supra note 2, at 285.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 286.
124. Id.
125. In re UAL Corp., 412 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2005).
126. Judge Easterbrook reluctantly sided with United on grounds that parties injured
by an erroneous injunction have no remedy. Id. (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S.
757, 770 (1983) ("A person injured by the issuance of an injunction later determined to be erroneous
has no action for damages in the absence of a bond.")).
127. Id.





liquid, and therefore inherently less valuable, shares.130 He also noted that the
injunction left investors forcibly undiversified at a time when United's future
was highly uncertain.1 31
Judge Easterbrook argued that depriving investors of liquidity was "both
imprudent and unnecessary." 132 He recommended several alternative
approaches that would have protected both carryovers and investors. 133
Pointing out that United's argument to protect its tax credits assumed that the
corporation would generate significant post-bankruptcy profits,' 34 he asserted
that the judge should have asked United to put its money where its mouth was:
the company could have offered a bond to compensate its investors. 135 A
possible concern with this suggestion is that credit markets may not have been
willing to underwrite such a bond. But Judge Easterbrook argued that United
would have no trouble obtaining a loan if the company were actually going to
generate a large profit after bankruptcy.136 It also probably would not owe
damages to its investors in this case.'37 If United were unable to borrow, this
would indicate that United's "contentions [were] hot air" and its carryovers
would never have value.'38 In that situation, Judge Easterbrook believed that
any injunction would be inappropriate.1 39
As an alternative to a judicially imposed bond-a preferable alternative,
in Judge Easterbrook's view-United and its Employee Stock Ownership Plan
130. Id.
131. Judge Easterbrook conceded that he trust was intentionally undiversified but
pointed out that shareholders put their investments in the hands of State Street, not the judiciary. The
investment was less valuable when it was no longer managed by a fiduciary. Id.
132. Id. at 778.
133. Judges have in fact limited the scope of trading injunctions. Many courts-
including the bankruptcy court in Prudential Lines itself-have enjoined trading by only some
shareholders (often shareholders that were or could become five-percent shareholders). Other courts
have implemented notice-and-objection procedures for certain trades. See, e.g., In re Northwest
Airlines, Case No. 05-17930 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2005); In re Delta Air Lines, Case No. 05-
17923 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2005); In re WorldCom, Case No. 02-13533 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar.
5, 2003). See Jeanne P. Darcey, Restrictions on Trading Claims in Bankruptcy: Preservation of the
Debtor 's NOLs, AM. BANKR. INST. (2009), http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters
/publicComp/vol6numl/Claims2.pdf, for a debtor-side practitioner's analysis of techniques to
encourage courts to adopt narrower trading injunctions. For a practitioner's analysis of the costs and
benefits of trading injunctions and the factors that courts should consider when designing them, see
Mark A. Speiser et al., NOLs: The Policy Conflicts Created by Trading Orders, COM. LENDING REV.,
May-June 2005.
134. United had over $1 billion in NOL carryovers when it filed for bankruptcy. As
discussed, judges rarely investigate the likelihood that tax credits have future value before granting
injunctions. Judge Easterbrook argued (as addressed in Part III) that carryovers only have value-and
therefore may only be protected as assets-if a corporation could generate future profits. In re UAL
Corp., 412 F.3d at 778.
135. In other words, United would put cash into (or credit behind) a security which
could later be used to compensate shareholders harmed by the injunction. Id. This approach, addressed
in Part IV, is similar to the method employed in In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004).
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(ESOP) could have contracted outside of bankruptcy to require United to
underwrite a bond in the context of a trading injunction. The bond could
compensate investors harmed by a decrease in the stock price during the
injunction. In the event of an increase in stock price-which would render the
bond unnecessary-an adequate-protection agreement would have required
stockholders to indemnify United for the cost of the bond. 140 Judge
Easterbrook argued that the parties would have wished to make this agreement
prior to bankruptcy had they fully considered the benefits of preserving the
carryovers.141 He therefore concluded that the bankruptcy judge should have
issued an order to mimic the agreement he parties would likely have made.14 2
In addition to noting the policy problems with the bankruptcy judge's
injunction, Easterbrook questioned its legal merits. Easterbrook read
Prudential Lines narrowly: he argued that the decision concerned only a
parent's claim of a worthless stock deduction based on its interest in a
subsidiary. 143 Nothing in the opinion, he asserted, supported the broad
proposition that any stock sale that forfeits tax credits constitutes an "exercise
of control" over the credits in violation of the automatic stay. 14 Judge
Easterbrook also raised the possibility that carryovers may not even qualify as
property under the Bankruptcy Code, although e declined to address this
question because he felt that Prudential Lines was distinguishable on other
grounds. 145 Judge Easterbrook thus indicated that the legal reasoning in
Prudential Lines itself may be questionable and asserted that its broad
application to bankruptcy cases is clearly erroneous. Judge Easterbrook's
discussion was a rare instance of a judge's analyzing and criticizing NOL-
based trading injunctions on the record.
Judge Easterbrook's criticism notwithstanding, the generally accepted
current law governing trading injunctions and NOLs in bankruptcy can be
summarized as follows. An ownership change is determined based on the five-
percent shareholder rules in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, subject to the 2013
amendments to the segregation rules. In bankruptcy, ownership changes are
140. Id.
141. Id. Judge Easterbrook did not address why the parties did not, in fact, consider
such an agreement. He simply noted that the parties could have made a "mutually beneficial" deal since
"gains from trade" were available. Id. Judge Easterbrook concluded from this that the judge "should
have crafted a mutual-protection covenant that mirrored the likely non-bankruptcy transaction." Id.
While he did not grapple with the question of why the judge should have imposed an agreement that the
parties did not make themselves, Judge Easterbrook surprisingly seemed to view a judicially created
contract as an exercise in judicial restraint. In his formulation, a judge issuing an injunction imposes
terms on the parties no matter what the judge chooses to do (if the parties did not expect or contract for
a freeze in trading). The adequate-protection agreement, in Judge Easterbrook's view, was the fairest
way to structure the injunction since it reflected the terms that reasonable parties would choose for
themselves instead of "cramming one side's position down the throat of the other." Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.; see 1 IU.S.C. § 362 (2012).




also subject to the bankruptcy exception to the change-in-control rule and the
alternate valuation option provided by the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980. Segal
and Prudential Lines establish that NOL carryovers are property of the
bankruptcy estate and may be protected by trading injunctions.
III. Criticism of the Current Approach
Academic 146 criticism of NOL policy under Chapter 11 has been
surprisingly muted. The few commentators who have touched on the issue
have focused almost exclusively on legal problems with Prudential Lines and
its broad application in Chapter 11. The policy considerations that Judge
Easterbrook began to unearth in UAL Corp. remain largely unventilated.
Potential solutions have garnered almost no attention. This Part first examines
legal critiques of the Prudential Lines doctrine and then begins to consider the
deep policy concerns implicated by injunctions in Chapter 11 cases.
A. Legal Critiques
1. NOL Carryovers Do Not Qualify as Bankruptcy-Estate Assets
While most jurists and corporations consider the issue settled law,14 7
some commentators still question whether loss carryovers are property of a
bankruptcy estate. 148 Max Barker frames this question by asking whether a
carryover resembles the type of property right that contains inherent limitations
or instead is the type that automatically continues until a superior interest is
asserted. An example of the latter would be a debtor's rights to the assets it
uses to secure a loan: the creditor's interest limits the debtor's interest, but only
because it is superior in the event that the debtor defaults. This type of interest
is clearly protected by the automatic stay: recall that the automatic stay is
designed to prevent creditors from dismembering a corporation by seizing
collateral. An example of the former type is a debtor's interest in a leased
warehouse or an insurance policy: it contains clear limitations and a built-in
expiration date. The practical difference for bankruptcy purposes is that the
automatic stay does not create any obligation for a landlord or an insurance
146. The treatment of NOLs under Chapter 11 has been discussed more frequently in
practitioner circles, but these discussions have focused mostly on techniques to persuade courts to adopt
injunctions (or not). See, e.g., Thomas W. Avent, Jr. & John F. Simon, Preserving Tax Benefits in
Troubled Companies-Navigating Mostly Uncharted Waters, 102 J. TAX'N 176 (2005).
147. See, e.g., Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 381 (1966); Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors v. PSS S.S. Co. (In re Prudential Lines Inc.), 928 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1991);
Objection of Wells Fargo Foothill, LLC at 8, In re Foothills Texas, Inc., 408 B.R. 573 (Bankr. D. Del.
Feb. 11, 2009) (No. 09-10452), 2009 WL 4078882. As discussed above, Segal does not actually address
whether carryovers are the property of the debtor estate, so there is a reasonable argument that the issue
is not actually settled. See supra note 113. Note that Congress did provide that NOL carryovers are
property of an individual debtor's bankruptcy estate. See II U.S.C. § 346 (2012).
148. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 2; Barker, supra note 120.
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company to renew its contract with the debtor. Barker believes that carryovers
more closely resemble the first type of interest: they exist only until a change
in ownership occurs. In Barker's formulation, this creates a "natural expiration
date" akin to the end of a lease or an insurance policy.149 Barker thus reasons
that carryovers do not qualify as assets of the bankruptcy estate: the estate has
no interest in maintaining carryovers after their "expiration date."
Barker's argument is not persuasive. Forfeiture of carryovers during a
change in control does not resemble the "natural expiration" of a lease.
Carryovers "naturally expire" after twenty years: this time limit is analogous to
a lease's expiration date. This is not the type of expiration at issue, however:
no one has argued that the bankruptcy estate has a property interest in
extending the statutory time limit on carryovers. The harm to the estate occurs
when tax assets are impaired before that date, just as harm occurs when a
valuable leasehold is canceled early. Carryovers are valuable assets because
they can offset any profits that a corporation generates within the specified
timeframe-unless the corporation's ownership changes. But an ownership
change is not an inevitable (or even necessarily likely) event. A carryover more
closely resembles a stock option that may not turn out to have any value:
potential worthlessness does not inherently limit a property interest.150
The nature of a debtor's property interest in carryovers thus strongly
indicates that carryovers qualify as assets of a bankruptcy estate. Courts have
long interpreted Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, which defines estate
property, to include "contingent interests and future interests."'5 1 Many courts
have gone farther, holding that "every conceivable interest of the debtor,
whether-future, non-possessory, contingent, speculative, or derivative, is within
the reach of the concept of 'property of the estate."'l52 An interest does not
cease to be property of the estate "simply because it is novel or contingent or
[because] enjoyment must be postponed." 153 Courts have consistently
construed Section 541 to cover lost profits, potentially refundable rental
deposits, and various types of tax refunds.1 54 While the Bankruptcy Code
149. Barker, supra note 120, at 8.
150. A stock option's expiration date resembles the time limit on the use of
carryovers: both types ofassets are potentially valuable until this final date.
151. Prudential Lines, 928 F.2d at 573; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).
152. In re Yonikus, 996 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1993), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014); see also Chartschlaa v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
538 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2008); Nickless v. McGrail & McGrail (In re Dooley), 399 B.R. 340, 348
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2009); 3A Bankr. Serv. L. Ed. § 29:32 (2013).
153. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966); see also Carlson v. Brandt, 250
B.R. 366, 372 (N.D. Ill. 2000), aff'd, 263 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2001); Chrysler LLC v. Plastech
Engineered Prods., Inc. (In re Plastech Engineered Prods., Inc.), 382 B.R. 90, 106 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2008); 3A Bankr. Serv. L. Ed. § 29:32 (2013).
154. See, e.g., Mid-Island Hosp. v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield (In re Mid-
Island Hosp.), 276 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (protecting lost profits); In re Thompson, 253 B.R. 823
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000) (protecting a rental deposit that would be refundable in the future only under a
certain contingency); Levine v. Telco Sys., Inc. (In re World Access, Inc.), 324 B.R. 662 (N.D. Ill.




explicitly excludes several types of assets from its definitions of estate
property, it never mentions carryovers.'55 Carryovers thus remain well within
the broad category of assets that has traditionally constituted estate property.156
At least one commentator has attempted to exclude carryovers from estate
property by simply arguing that the speculative nature of a carryover prevents
it from being "property" pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code.'5 7 This analysis
considers Prudential Lines a mistake and contends that treating a "potential
deduction " as estate property runs counter to traditional judicial and
administrative policy.'58 This rationale is even less convincing than Barker's
framework since the Code specifically includes contingent interests in the
estate. The fact that carryovers have no clear value until they offset profits
means only that the value of a carryover is contingent, not that a carryover is
not an asset at all.1 59 Like most "contingent interests and future interests"-
indeed, like many concrete and present interests-the value of a carryover is
uncertain. This does not mean that it is not an asset.
2. Congress Did Not Intend the Automatic Stay to Protect Carryovers
From a Change in Ownership Caused by Trading
While it is difficult to argue that carryovers are not assets of a bankruptcy
estate, there is a persuasive case to be made that the automatic stay should not
be construed to protect a corporation from losing its carryovers due to a change
in ownership. In the language of the Bankruptcy Code, the stay prohibits "any
act to obtain possession of the property of the estate or property from the estate
or to exercise control over the property of the estate."60 Historical analysis and
logical consideration of this language reveal that Congress probably did not
intend for this category of behavior to include trading in a corporation's stock
or debt.161
Several courts have contemplated Congress's intent in adding the
"exercise control" provision quoted above, which did not appear in the
155. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (2012).
156. Id.
157. See Joni Larson, The Bankruptcy Court Overlooks Tax Laws in In Re Prudential
Lines, Inc.: An NOL Should Not Be Property of a Bankruptcy Estate, 29 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 23,
(1993); Morris, supra note 2, at 291 n.26 (describing Larson's argument and analyzing whether
carryovers are estate property).
158. See Larson, supra note 157, at 35; Morris, supra note 2, at 291 n.26 (describing
Larson's argument).
159. See In re Cumberland Farms, Inc., 162 B.R. 62 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993).
160. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
161. Even the cases often invoked to support trading injunctions do not assume that
this was Congress's intent. Recall that Prudential Lines explicitly states only that a parent's claim of a
worthless stock deduction at the expense of its subsidiary's carryover constitutes an "exercise of
control" over this asset of the debtor. This conclusion itself may be debatable. More importantly-as
Judge Easterbrook argued in UAL Corp.-it is distinguishable from the proposition that trading of debt
and equity during bankruptcy is an exercise of control over a debtor's assets. See supra Part II.
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Bankruptcy Code until the 1984 amendments.1 62 A common interpretation is
that Congress simply meant to broaden the automatic stay to prohibit actions
similar, but not technically equivalent, to "possession."63 The Sixth Circuit,
for instance, concluded that Congress likely intended to broaden the concept of
possession to include "control" through voting trusts or shareholder
agreements.164 The court also speculated that Congress may have wanted to
clarify that the automatic stay applies to property of the estate that the debtor
does not possess or directly control.16 1 Other courts have similarly decided that
the "exercise control" wording does not significantly expand the automatic
stay: most courts have applied the phrase only to behavior that approximates
possession.166 Under this interpretation, the automatic stay does not apply to
trading that might endanger a corporation's tax credits, as the traders do not
take possession of the carryovers.
Even under a broader interpretation of Congress's language, common
sense suggests that he automatic stay should not apply to the behavior of
traders. The traders wish to exercise their own property rights for their own
benefit. Any effect this may have on the corporation's assets is incidental. It
cannot be that any action that risks reducing the value of a corporation's assets
should be deemed to violate the automatic stay. Indeed, it would be
preposterous to prohibit certain actions whose effects on a corporation's assets
are far more concrete and predictable than the effects of trading in the debtor
corporation's securities. For instance, consider a factory being built near a
debtor corporation's headquarters that may decrease the value of the debtor's
real estate.167 Should courts halt construction in the name of the automatic
stay? For that matter, why should judges not enjoin competing companies from
producing new product lines that may devalue a debtor's intellectual property?
One might counter that the Prudential Lines holding refers to behavior
that eliminates a debtor's property, not behavior that devalues property.'68 This
distinction is not as clear as it sounds, however. An action that incidentally
eliminates an asset's value is not different in kind from one that merely reduces
it. Returning to the previous examples, it would be perfectly possible for a new
patent to reduce the value of a corporation's intellectual property to zero. Any
number of third-party actions might reduce the value of a stock option to zero,
but courts would never enjoin behavior that might drive down the market price
of a company's stock simply because a bankrupt corporation owned stock
162. See, e.g., Javens v. City of Hazel Park (In re Javens), 107 F.3d 359, 368 (6th Cir.
1997); see also Morris, supra note 2, at 295.
163. See Morris, supra note 2, at 295.
164. Javens, 107 F.3d at 368; see also Morris, supra note 2, at 295.
165. See Javens, 107 F.3d at 295.
166. See, e.g., Beker Indus. Corp. v. Fla. Land & Water Adjudicatory Comn'n (In re
Beker Industries Corp.), 57 B.R. 611, 626 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also Morris, supra note 2, at
295.
167. See Barker, supra note 120, at 86.
168. See id.
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options in that company at a higher price. Injunctions against trading make
even less sense if they do not surgically target trades that cause changes in
control.
If the proposition that equity trading violates the automatic stay is
difficult to defend, the assertion that debt trading violates the automatic stay is
almost impossible to justify. It is impossible for any debt transaction to have a
direct effect on a corporation's carryovers. A subsequent reorganization plan
that exchanges the debt for equity may trigger a change in ownership, but the
cause of the change in ownership is the plan itself: it is always possible to
design a plan that does not cause such a change. Of course, such a plan may
not be viable: the state of the corporation may demand conversion of most or
all debt to equity in the reorganized company. Thus, it may be easier to
reorganize if debtholders cannot trade since all reorganization options are on
the table (without endangering tax assets) if debtholders remain the same.
However, the fact that debt traders may make the reorganization process more
challenging does not mean that these traders exercise control over a property
right. While Max Barker argues that restricting a debtor's reorganization
options may amount to exercising control over the debtor's exclusive right to
propose a reorganization plan,'6 9 this assertion is quite a stretch: not only is it
unclear whether the right to propose a plan is a property interest, but the debtor
retains its exclusive right to propose a plan no matter how many debtholders
sell their claims. The Bankruptcy Code never guarantees the debtor a smooth
and easy route to reorganization.
3. Bankruptcy Judges' More General Equitable Powers Do Not Authorize
Trading Injunctions
In addition to providing for the automatic stay, the Bankruptcy Code
empowers judges to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of [Chapter 1 1]."l7 If a debtor asks the
bankruptcy judge to issue a preliminary injunction based on this clause, the
judge must evaluate whether the debtor is likely to succeed on the merits,
whether it will suffer irreparable damage if the injunction is denied, and
whether the injunction will harm others or instead serve the public interest.'7 '
While courts have invoked this provision consistently in granting injunctions,
debtors' motions usually go unchallenged, and judges almost never analyze
these issues on the record.17 2 Commentators have argued that injunctions based
on this broad provision are especially suspect when they are included in the
169. Id. at 87.
170. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
171. See Morris, supra note 2, at 298.
172. See id. at 286.
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package of first-day motions. 173 This argument is strong: it seems highly
improbable that a debtor could show that a successful reorganization and
significant future profits are both likely. It would be even harder to establish
that a carryover would be lost in the absence of an injunction. Yet these
showings are necessary to establish the likelihood of irreparable harm and of
success on the merits.1 74 Thus, judges' general equitable powers provide little
support for injunctions.
4. Trading Injunctions Violate the Fifth Amendment
The Supreme Court has established that the Takings Clause1 7 5 applies not
only to the direct seizure of property but also to unfair redistribution of burdens
among individuals.17 6 This vague standard takes into account the economic
impact of redistribution and its consistency with parties' plans and
expectations.177 Jean Morris has invoked this reasoning to argue that trading
injunctions are unconstitutional if they deny liquidity to security-holders.7 8
Not only does the loss of liquidity represent a significant economic cost in its
own right, but the prevention of trading also seriously undermines investors'
reasonable expectations and plans.179 Since investors receive nothing in return
for this loss, injunctions may qualify as a "taking" of private property "without
just compensation."
On its face, Morris's analysis is appealing. Her argument highlights one
of the fundamental concerns with trading injunctions in Chapter 11: the
constitutional analysis is grounded in the costs created by trading injunctions.
Morris makes a compelling case that Fifth Amendment precedent demands
protection of the property right enjoyed by holders of liquid securities during a
bankruptcy proceeding. However, this argument may be more academic than
173. See id. at 285 (commenting that the inclusion of injunctions in first-day motions
is "remarkable").
174. See id. at 299.
175 . "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
176. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982);
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see also Morris, supra note 2, at 301.
177. See Morris, supra note 2, at 301.
178. Id. Morris draws a distinction between the Takings Clause's application to
injunctions based on § 105 and injunctions based on the automatic stay. While she believes that § 105
injunctions may be unconstitutional, she points out that § 362 requires judges to grant relief from the
automatic stay if a nondebtor party's interests are not "adequately protected." She therefore argues that
the automatic stay, while it may constitute a taking, is not an unconstitutional taking according to the
language of the statute because the Bankruptcy Code requires compensation for affected investors. Id.
Of course, judges have not actually provided this compensation in Chapter 11 cases involving
injunctions to protect carryovers. See, e.g., In re UAL Corp., 412 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2005) (criticizing
the decision below for failing to require a bond to compensate investors for a trading injunction).
Morris's argument implies that injunctions based on the automatic stay violate § 362 if investors receive
no compensation.




practical: security-holders have yet to mount a significant constitutional
challenge to a trading injunction in a Chapter 11 case and, as Morris notes,
management would likely respond to such a challenge by insisting that the risk
of liquidity loss in bankruptcy is factored into security prices.'80
B. Policy Critiques
The legal problems with trading injunctions in Chapter 11 are numerous
and troublesome. However, even if injunctions fit clearly within the law, they
would still raise important policy concerns. While commentators have devoted
little attention to the policy questions surrounding trading injunctions, these
issues deserve deep consideration and broad ventilation. The potential evils of
injunctions do not stop at their harsh consequences for investors. Injunctions
also create dubious incentives for the parties in a bankruptcy proceeding and
provide management with a powerful-and unjustified-weapon to entrench
its position.'8 This Section briefly develops a policy critique of the broader
NOL regime. It then outlines specific problems with the handling of carryovers
in Chapter 11, building on several critiques that include some of the concerns
Judge Easterbrook began to uncover in UAL Corp.
1. The Incentive-Based Argument for Carryovers Is Particularly Unlikely
to Apply in Chapter 11 Cases
Recall that the policy justification for NOL tax credits is correcting the
undesirable incentives that the one-year tax period creates for corporations that
must incur long-term losses to produce eventual profit. For this justification to
hold water, the tax credit must go to a corporation whose managers consciously
consider a risky project over a multi-year horizon. Additionally, the risky
project must fall in the range of profitability in which its social rate of return is
positive but the one-year tax period would reduce its internal rate of return
below that of an alternate investment. Otherwise, the tax credit does not
improve incentives.1 82
Congress and the IRS have attempted to protect these policy goals by
limiting carryovers when a merger or significant change in ownership might
combine income-producing assets with a loss corporation.183 However, the
180. This assertion may be questionable, however: this type of injunction is a
relatively recent phenomenon and does not apply equally to all shareholders.
181. See infra Part III.B.3.
182. For further discussion of the impact of the one-year tax period, see, for example,
Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 56 n.135 (2006). For an
economic analysis of loss offsets, see Mark Campisano & Roberta Romano, Recouping Losses: The
Case for Full Loss Offsets, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 5 (1981) (arguing for recoupment as opposed to
deduction). For a summary of efficiency arguments for NOLs, see MARK P. KEIGHTLEY & MOLLY F.
SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42726, THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX SYSTEM: OVERVIEW AND
OPTIONS FOR REFORM 5-6 (Dec. 1, 2014).
183. See supra Part I.
185
Yale Journal on Regulation
NOL structure makes no attempt to differentiate corporations that incur
incidental losses from those that deliberately pursue projects with interim
losses. By basing the value of retained carryovers on a corporation's post-
reorganization stock value, the Bankruptcy Code has strayed even farther from
the goal of limiting carryovers to profit realized by the loss entity.184
If the incentive-based benefits of NOL carryovers are questionable in
many cases, they are especially suspect in the Chapter 11 context. As discussed
previously, many commentators question trading injunctions because they
doubt that a corporation in Chapter 11 will both successfully reorganize and
manage to generate enough profits to take advantage of carryovers. Even if a
new corporation does generate profits, the very fact that it does so through
reorganization makes it unlikely that the incentive structure from the original
project will hold. A corporation's insolvency indicates that the original project
that produced the NOLs did not, in fact, generate adequate future profits. The
loss credits would incentivize a poor business decision.
In fact, the projects that tend to precede Chapter 11 reorganizations are
exactly the types of projects that tax law should discourage.' 85 The ideal
candidate for Chapter 11 reorganization is a corporation that cannot service its
debt but can cover its variable costs if it is restructured. By canceling old
equity and converting debt to new equity, the corporation may be able to
generate a healthy profit in the future. Consider, for example, the railroad
paradigm: a railroad cannot make its debt payments, but it would be able to
make a profit if it did not have to make these payments. Reorganization can fix
this problem by wiping out equity and giving the company to the creditors.
This preserves the corporation, but it does not make the original project
profitable: the project appears profitable only once the debt used to finance it
disappears. There is no incentive-based justification for allowing this
corporation to offset its profits with NOLs from the original project: the project
was not, in fact, profitable.'86 The NOLs do not offset profits from the original
project but rather offset gains from reorganization. Insolvent corporations do
not fit the mold that justifies carryovers.
The managers of a debtor corporation would likely respond that the
corporation is not, in fact, insolvent: it may have simply faced a liquidity crisis
and filed for Chapter 11 to prevent creditors from dismembering it. Perhaps the
184. After a significant change in capital structure, the stock value (and subsequent
profit) is likely no indicator whatsoever of the profitability of the original project that caused the losses.
See infra Part III.B.2.
185. Of course, the tax benefits will not give equity holders an incentive to choose
projects that will make the firm insolvent; they will never get to use the credits anyway if they are
wiped out. They will, however, decrease the cost of debt for risky projects, as discussed below, and
generally incentivize risk.
186. There may be good reasons to subsidize railroads: transportation infrastructure
likely generates significant positive externalities. However, projects like these should be encouraged
through direct subsidies (including specific tax credits) or government funding, not through broad




corporation is in the middle of the project that would justify carryovers: maybe
it has incurred more losses than expected and has depleted its capital but still
expects to make profits in the future. A firm in this situation has the best case
for protection of carryovers in Chapter 11, but problems with its argument
remain. The incentive foundation for carryovers still fails if the corporation
reorganizes: the carryovers will offset gains from reorganization. Retaining
carryovers for a corporation in the midst of a multi-year project might actually
be justified if the carryovers' value were limited to the value of the corporation
before reorganization. However, since the 1986 Code allows reorganized firms
to base their credits on the post-reorganization value, the incentive structure
falls apart as NOLs will offset gains from reorganization rather than gains from
the project that generated the losses.
Another counterargument is that carryovers should remain with the
reorganized corporation to protect the creditors, who become the new
stockholders. This approach, however, endows creditors with a dubious moral
high ground. As Judge Easterbrook noted in UAL Corp., creditors invest in
corporations-they investigate the projects they underwrite and adjust their
interest rates to compensate for the risk of default.' Creditors are entitled to a
priority claim on the corporation's assets and nothing more.188 There is no
reason to treat tax credits as sacrosanct because they might benefit creditors,
and there are excellent reasons not to do so. Providing tax credits for
reorganized corporations that were insolvent artificially lowers the interest rate
for risky ventures, including ventures that may have negative expected
values.'89 This is a perverse ex ante incentive, and it is not the incentive that
justifies carryovers. Carryovers are useful if they encourage corporations to
pursue positive-net-present-value projects they would otherwise avoid. When
carryovers instead subsidize negative-net-present-value projects, the carryovers
are harmful: they encourage corporations to take on a greater-than-optimal
level of risk.190 All of this suggests that there is very little policy justification
for protecting NOL carryovers during Chapter 11.
2. Freezing Trading Can Significantly Harm Investors
The illiquidity that results from a trading injunction clearly harms
stockholders and debtholders. As Judge Easterbrook observed in UAL Corp.,
loss of liquidity is an "immediate and independent injury" that leaves investors
vulnerable if they want-or need-to sell. Moreover, the loss of liquidity
introduces uncompensated risk by preventing investors from diversifying their
187. In re UAL Corp., 412 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 2005).
188. See the legal discussion above about the status of tax credits as debtor assets-
while they are assets, they are likely not the type of assets that the automatic stay is meant to protect for
creditors.
189. See supra Part I.
190. See id.
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portfolios and leaves them with a type of security that is not what they paid for,
planned for, and owned. These are the most obvious costs to weigh when
considering a trading injunction, and they are the ones that Judge Easterbrook
and other judges tend to consider.'9 1 Even if the merits of freezing the market
were not questionable, these costs may exceed the value of the potential tax
credit in many, or even most, situations.'92
The greatest costs of a trading freeze, however, may lie beyond these
direct costs to investors. By forcing original creditors-who wanted to invest
in a solvent firm-to ride out the bankruptcy process, an injunction denies the
entire reorganization effort the extensive and well-documented benefits of
claims trading.'9 3 By allowing experienced distressed-debt investors to replace
a firm's original creditors at the negotiating table, claims trading can
streamline the reorganization process. While a trading injunction freezes
institutional creditors whose business model assumes a steady return on
investments-creditors who are likely eager to walk away-claims trading
brings in speculative investors who specialize in distressed debt investing.194
These investors are more likely to bring enthusiasm, energy, and innovative
solutions to the table.1 9s They are also more likely to have the expertise and
desire to run and grow a reorganized firm should they exit Chapter 11 as
controlling shareholders.196 Their presence offers clear benefits for the debtor
corporation itself, and it also offers broader benefits for all parties: as a result
of the liquidity they enjoy, parties are able to specialize in the investments that
define their business models. Claims trading thus promotes efficiency on an
industry-wide-and economy-wide-level. Investors can concentrate their
expertise in particular areas and run effective businesses accordingly.
It is important to note that distressed-debt investors almost always
purchase debt with the intention of acquiring control of the debtor corporation
post-reorganization.197 As mentioned above, this goal gives such investors an
entirely different perspective from institutional creditors who expect a fixed
return on a loan. Significantly, distressed-debt investors' pursuit of control also
191. See In re UAL Corp., 412 F.3d at 778.
192. See Morris, supra note 2, at 300 (describing the costs and benefits of
injunctions).
193. See, e.g., Paul M. Goldschmid, More Phoenix than Vulture: The Case for
Distressed Investor Presence in the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REv.
191, 215, 256-59 (2005) (describing the benefits of distressed-investor involvement in the bankruptcy
process).
194. See id. at 256 (describing the differing negotiation goals of bank lenders and
distressed debt funds). Goldschmid also notes that regulatory issues limit institutional creditors' options
in bankruptcy: banks must write down distressed debt to below potential recovery value, and bank
holding companies must dispose of shares of non-banking institutions acquired in bankruptcy within
two years. These factors direct banks' goals toward quick retrieval of capital, not long-term growth. Id.
at 258.
195. Id. at 259.





puts them at odds with the debtor's management, indicating that issuing
injunctions to protect debtor assets does not protect the interests of creditors
but rather protects the interests of the debtor's management. Investors often
pay a premium to acquire enough debt o obtain a controlling equity stake in a
reorganized company. These investors hope that the reorganization plan will
convert debt to equity. Assuming distressed-debt investors do not make blind
decisions without researching a target company's financials, such investors
know that the firm will lose its carryovers if the bid is successful and the
reorganization plan is confirmed.198 The fact that investors are willing to pay a
premium for a stake in the reorganized firm, knowing the firm stands to lose its
carryovers, indicates that the investors believe they can run the firm better than
current management can. Allowing the investment thus should be beneficial
from an efficiency standpoint. Claims trading thus should benefit every party
involved, 199 with the exception of the current management that wishes to
maintain control.
3. In Practice, Trading Injunctions Anchor Management's Position in a
Failing Firm
A trading injunction provides a remarkably powerful way for
management to defend itself against a takeover attempt. Bankrupt firms are
ripe for takeover, and management's position is in jeopardy no matter what
happens: unless management can find a handle to hold onto control, it may not
remain at the helm when the reorganization process ends. Any tool to prevent a
change in control-even temporarily-will be attractive to management. This
is exactly what trading injunctions do: they provide a bulletproof vest for
management under the false pretense of protecting the firm's carryovers.
One need only look to the reactions of management to Judge
Easterbrook's dicta in UAL Corp. to find convincing evidence of this view.
Judge Easterbrook's dicta frightened management-side attorneys: they worried
that their powerful entrenchment device might disappear.200 Law firms thus
198. Admittedly, one common argument for trading injunctions is that buyers and
sellers cannot know when their transaction will jeopardize tax credits. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 2, at
297 (discussing issues with "transfers by other unrelated shareholders or clainiholders over whom the
transferring shareholder or claimholder has no control (and concerning which the transferring
shareholder or claimholder may have no knowledge)"). However, this argument rings hollow when an
investor seeks to acquire a controlling interest: after all, anyone seeking to acquire 50% of a firm's
equity through claims trading knows that the carryovers will disappear if the reorganization proceeds as
planned.
199. In addition to the overall efficiency benefits from allowing trading-which
should benefit equity-holders--claims trading benefits debt-holders who wish to sell and investors who
wish to buy. While management might benefit from the overall efficiency gain of allowing trading, it
would likely lose more from its loss of control.
200. See, e.g., Brad B. Erens & Mark G. Douglas, The Poison Pill Alternative to
Stock Trading Injunctions in Chapter 11, JONES DAY (Jan./Feb. 2007), http://www.jonesday.com
/newsknowledge/publicationdetail.aspx?publication=3935.
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sought new ways to protect their clients from takeover attempts.201 Some even
suggested that firms prepare poison pills in case courts stopped issuing
injunctions.202 Noting that "restrictions on stock and/or claims trading has
become almost routine in large [C]hapter 11 cases involving public companies
on the basis that such restrictions are vital to prevent forfeiture of favorable tax
attributes," Jones Day attorneys Brad B. Erens and Mark G. Douglas
commented that "the possibility that trading injunctions will be harder to obtain
begs the question whether other means of preventing significant shifts in equity
ownership are available."203 They went on to analyze the efficacy of poison
pills as techniques for preventing changes in control during Chapter 11.204
The thrust of the attorneys' analysis was an attempt to prevent changes in
ownership. While they framed their discussion in terms of the general goal of
preserving carryovers, avoiding changes in ownership offers such clear
independent benefits for management hat the mere conflict raises a concern
even without evidence of misused injunctions. The reality of bankruptcy
procedure deepens this concern: it is difficult for anyone to challenge
management's decision to request an injunction. If a debtor's management
asserts on the first day of bankruptcy that the debtor's carryovers are a valuable
asset and are likely to disappear quickly without an injunction, it is unlikely
that another party will have the information or the sophistication to challenge
this claim.205 Management's inside access gives it leverage and presents a
substantial risk of misuse of this authority.
4. Since Trading Injunctions Do Not Last Forever, Their Value Is Often
Illusory
Even if none of the above concerns apply, trading injunctions' capacity to
protect tax assets is questionable. It is indeed possible to imagine a situation in
which a corporation takes on a risky project with the expectation of interim
losses on the way to an eventual profit, declares Chapter 11 due to a temporary
liquidity crisis, still generates profits that greatly exceed the costs of the trading
freeze, and is run by saintly management who seek an injunction purely to
protect tax assets on behalf of investors.206 Even in this idealized scenario,
however, there is no guarantee that an injunction would preserve carryovers
201. See id.
202. See, e.g., id. para. 15.
203. Id. para. 1.
204. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG
CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 174 (2006) (describing management's incentives and
informational advantages in asset sales).
205. This is a well-documented problem in many stages of the bankruptcy process:
both information asymmetry and coordination problems among stakeholders tend to give
management-and sometimes some select stakeholders-considerable verage.
206. Of course, the legal and policy concerns of freezing trading would still apply-




long enough for them to offset profits.207 When the injunction is lifted after the
reorganization, stockholders will naturally start trading again-anyone who
wanted to trade and was frustrated by the injunction will offload shares as soon
as possible.2 0s If this trading creates a change in control before the corporation
realizes enough profits to use its carryovers, the injunction's benefits would
evaporate. The injunction rests on particularly shaky legal ground in this case:
it is almost impossible to justify a claim of "irreparable harm" to a debtor
based on the loss of an asset that will disappear later anyway.2 09
IV. Potential Improvements to the Current Approach
The current bankruptcy approach to carryovers creates numerous
problems, both from legal and policy perspectives. While there is no single
solution to these problems, many alternatives exist hat would improve the
status quo. The ideal policy would allow corporations to use NOL carryovers
to offset only those profits generated by projects that the original corporation
undertook with the expectation of interim losses. The policy would deny
carryovers in all other situations. This would prohibit the retention of
carryovers in most Chapter 11 cases. This perfect policy is impossible to
achieve directly in practice, but the strategies below would all be closer to this
perfect policy than blanket injunctions in Chapter 11 cases are. This Part
briefly offers several options.
The most modest option would be to continue issuing injunctions to
prevent some transactions that would trigger changes in control, but to provide
a mechanism to identify situations in which injunctions are inappropriate.
Alternatively, judges could allow one side to continue behaving as it would
like but force it to compensate the other side for resultant losses. This is the
idea behind both injunction bonds and trading taxes. These remedies are the
least comprehensive: they do little to address the fundamental policy problems
with carryovers in bankruptcy. More radical approaches, such as making
carryovers contingent on later approval, might be more difficult to implement
but could reform tax policy to realign incentives. The most radical approach of
all may be the simplest: bankruptcy judges would simply stop issuing trading
injunctions and let the chips fall where they may.
207. Several commentators have mentioned this wrinkle in the justification for
injunctions. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 2, at 299.
208. This would be particularly likely because stockholders who suffer from a loss of
liquidity during the injunction may grow in number as the injunction drags on, leading to a larger need
for liquidity on the day it is lifted. See generally In re UAL Corp., 412 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2005).
209. Admittedly, the uncertainty regarding the end status of the credit gives it some
value from an ex ante perspective, but broad policy justifications become thin if credits disappear before
realization in a significant number of cases.
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A. Stop Issuing Injunctions in Chapter 11; Leave the Rest of the Tax Regime in
Place
The simplest solution to most of the legal and policy critiques outlined
above is to end the practice of issuing injunctions to protect tax credits.
Investors in bankrupt firms could trade at will, and debtors would lose their
carryovers if a change in control resulted. This Note argues that this approach
would be good tax policy in most Chapter 11 cases: the fact that a corporation
needed to reorganize likely means that the project that generated the losses will
not create net profits. Only losses from eventually profitable projects should
become tax credits.210 This proposal would eliminate the other concerns about
injunctions; all legal and policy problems would disappear.
A potential-and legitimate-criticism of this approach is that it enables
groups of investors to threaten coercive trading. Large stockholders or major
creditors could threaten to cause a change in control in order to gain leverage
in Chapter 11 negotiations. They would effectively be holding carryovers
hostage in order to seize a larger-than-deserved slice of the bankruptcy pie.
Such behavior is not unique to bankruptcy or to the protection of tax assets: it
resembles the corporate greenmail situation in which a major shareholder
threatens a takeover in order to coerce a favorable buyout. However,
manipulative tactics might be particularly difficult to prevent in Chapter 11: the
changes in statutory and contractual requirements for buybacks211 that have
helped temper greenmail would not be a viable solution for the carryover
problem.212
On the other hand, the role of the bankruptcy judge in Chapter 11
negotiations might provide an opportunity to rein in coercive behavior on an ad
hoc basis. Chapter 11 proceedings present numerous opportunities for such
coercion, and to prevent such coercion, bankruptcy judges must attempt to
ensure the general fairness of the process. Thus, the Chapter 11 framework
may help guard against manipulative maneuvers in the carryover context.
If investors truly value the protection afforded by injunctions, this
proposal would not be harmful, as contractual protections could take the place
of injunctions. Courts have upheld contractual prohibitions against
alienability2 13 in the corporate context as long as they are precise and clearly
articulated.214 Creditors who consider carryovers an asset in case of bankruptcy
210. And it certainly means that the full post-reorganization profits will not be net
gains from the project. See supra Part III.B.2.
211. Notably, there is a 50% tax on income from greenmail, I.R.C. § 5881 (2012), and
many corporate charters now contain anti-greenmail provisions that prevent management from
unilaterally approving large buybacks, see Ronald J. Gilson, Drafting an Effective Greenmail
Prohibition, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 329 (1988).
212. See generally Gilson, supra note 211.
213. That is, contractual restrictions on sale or transfer.
214. See, e.g., Vardanyan v. Close-Up Intern., Inc., 315 Fed. Appx. 315, 316 (2d Cir.




would adjust their interest rates to reward corporations for restrictions on
equity trades. Investors would pay a premium for unrestricted stock based on
how much they value the ability to trade freely. A corporation would impose
trading restrictions if it believed that this premium would be greater than the
increased cost of credit for a corporation without restrictions.2 15 If all parties
have adequate information, this mechanism should ensure that corporations
choose trading restrictions only when benefit exceeds cost: if creditors value
restrictions more than stockholders value uninhibited trading, corporations
have an incentive to impose restrictions. If the analysis in this Note is correct,
however, most corporations would not choose this route.
B. Eliminate the 1986 Act's Alternate Valuation Option for Bankrupt Finns
A parallel policy adjustment to ending the injunction habit would be to
eliminate the 1986 Act's alternate valuation option for bankrupt firms.2 16 While
this proposal would not directly address the injunction problem, it would help
keep the treatment of NOLs in line with policy objectives. The 1986 Act's
general NOL rules wisely limit carryovers to the value of a corporation
immediately before a change in control. If applied correctly, this standard
should prevent trafficking in carryovers and tie them directly to the profits
created by the project that generated the losses. There is no reason to depart
from this framework in bankruptcy. It is no coincidence that the value of a
corporation's shares tends to be very low immediately before reorganization:
the low share price reflects that the project that created the firm's carryovers
did not generate-and is not expected to generate-a large profit. The typical
approach of limiting the value of carryovers to the corporation's value before
the change in control is appropriate in this situation: allowing a corporation to
maintain carryovers equal to its post-reorganization value enables the
corporation to offset profits created by the reorganization, not to offset profits
generated by the original project.
From a strict tax-policy perspective, the standard bankruptcy exception to
the change-in-control rule-which allows corporations to treat creditors as
owners for change-in-control purposes-is also questionable. This provision is
the linchpin that allows companies to maintain their tax credits during most
Loan Ass'n, 482 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1972). Most alienability provisions are found in the context of
closely held corporations-indeed, the purpose of such restrictions is often to keep a firm in a family's
control or to prevent a firm from accumulating enough shareholders to necessitate SEC registration.
However, these provisions can be used in public corporations' stock as well. For examples of
contractual trading restrictions in public corporations, see in re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58
(Del. Ch. 2007).
215. In making this decision, the corporation would have to predict the aggregate
increased cost of credit in the absence of trading restrictions and the aggregate premium that all
stockholders would pay to trade freely, so the determination would depend on capital structure. This
makes sense: the cost and benefit of trading restrictions vary according to how many creditors benefit
and how many stockholders uffer.
216. See supra Part 11.
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reorganizations: carryovers would otherwise disappear whenever creditors
received at least a 50% stake in a reorganized firm. 2 17 The previous Part
explains why allowing carryovers to survive reorganization violates the policy
foundation on which carryovers rest. The provision that makes this survival
possible demonstrates where law diverges from policy: treating creditors as
stockholders divorces carryovers from the behavior that created the losses. The
provision severs initial losses from eventual profits by ignoring shifts in capital
structure and effectively operating as if debt that was converted had never
existed.218 This mechanism allows carryovers to offset profits that are actually
gains from restructuring: it is no surprise that a project will often seem
profitable when the debt used to finance it is ignored. Congress intended the
bankruptcy exception to prevent the change-in-control rule from extending
beyond its purpose: the rule was meant only to prevent mergers that facilitate
trafficking in tax attributes, not to limit carryovers in reorganizations. From a
policy standpoint, however, a reorganization is not entirely different from a
merger: the corporation that uses the carryovers is not the same one that
incurred the losses, and the profits that a reorganized corporation generates
may exceed the value of the original corporation's project.219
Proponents of the current policy would likely argue that the alternate
valuation option and the bankruptcy exception to the change-in-control rule are
essential for successful reorganizations. If reorganizations universally
destroyed tax assets, parties might be less willing to contemplate them. From a
policy perspective, proponents of the status quo would argue that
reorganization is designed to maximize the size of the debtor-corporation
"pie" -in other words, the point of bankruptcy is to prevent dismemberment of
firms by creditors and maximize the value of assets. It would seem that
destroying tax credits runs counter to this policy goal. However, bankruptcy
policy's perspective must be broader than that of an individual firm. If the
general goals of bankruptcy run counter to fair and efficient tax policy, tax
concerns may demand less robust protections in bankruptcy. The special rules
for bankruptcy amount to a tax subsidy rather than a logical piece of the overall
NOL regime. While some might insist that subsidizing reorganizations is good
policy, the numerous costs discussed in this Note suggest that this particular
subsidy is counterproductive. As discussed, a decision to subsidize
reorganizing corporations also threatens to encourage businesses to take on
overly risky projects.
217. If the creditors owned stock before the reorganization or if other five-percent
shareholders had increased their holdings during the three-year test period, the reorganization could
trigger a change in control even if creditors received less than 50% of the reorganized firm. See supra
Part I.C.
218. The retroactive treatment of this debt as equity for tax purposes adjusts taxes to
"pretend" that creditors were, in fact, stockholders all along.
219. Based on the above analysis, the carryovers will exceed the profits from the




C. Limit Corporations' Ability to Use NOL Credits
An aggressive attempt to align the tax regime with its policy objectives
might involve taxpayer-specific approval for the deduction of carryovers from
income. In the Chapter 11 context, such a policy would require the post-
reorganization firm to demonstrate that i deserves the tax credits. At the very
least, this would entail proof that the reorganization did not result in the
purchase or transfer of these credits to a profitable corporation.220 A better
approach would require the corporation to demonstrate that the profits were the
direct result of the project that incurred the losses. This reform theoretically
could fix the overall policy problems with the NOL regime by denying
carryovers whenever they are inconsistent with policy objectives.
However, the proposal is probably too cumbersome to be successful in
practice. The approach would require an administrative agency-probably the
IRS-to review thousands of applications for ratification of tax credits. This
volume of adjudications would overwhelm an agency, and the efficacy of the
process would also be questionable. The administrative law judge-or whoever
reviews the applications-would be unlikely to have specific knowledge about
the financials and decision-making details of the taxpayer in question.
Management's informational advantage would perhaps become a problem, as
many corporations would be able to selectively produce facts to justify use of
the credit.22 1
A more modest way to institute taxpayer-specific approval of carryovers
in Chapter 11 cases would be to require reorganized corporations to justify the
reinstatement of carryovers at the conclusion of the Chapter 11 process. This is
an attractive approach, and it is much more workable than the broad conversion
of carryovers into contingent credits. Bankruptcy judges would freeze
carryovers on the first day of bankruptcy. The carryovers would not be lost due
to a change in control or any other reason, and investors could continue to
trade. After plan confirmation, the bankruptcy judge would determine-in
consultation with the various parties 222 -whether reinstatement of the
carryovers is consistent with legal and policy objectives. This approach would
promote flexibility in deciding when firms can retain carryovers: judges would
not be bound by strict, and often arbitrary, rules about changes in ownership.
While taxpayer-specific approval shares some of the other proposals'
informational difficulties, it offers the important benefit of removing
negotiation about carryovers from the Chapter 11 process. This addresses
220. In a sense, however, almost all reorganizations do. See supra Part IV.B.
221. Or, depending on how stringent a standard the agency employs, most requests
might be denied. In either case, this approach seems unlikely to separate accurately the corporations that
should be able to use the credits from those that should not.
222. To make this an adversarial proceeding, the bankruptcy judge could invite the
IRS to participate. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
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several of the policy concerns identified above.2 23 Management would not be
able to use carryovers as opportunistic tools, and coercive threats to cause
changes in control would no longer haunt Chapter 11 negotiations.
Additionally, the frantic nature of the injunction request would disappear:
judges would no longer find themselves in an impossible position in which
they must either grant an injunction and risk being accused of endorsing
management's coercion or deny it and risk destroying a debtor's value.224
Instead, parties would have time to present evidence, and the judge would have
time to review it. The informational asymmetry would not disappear, but the
problem would abate if injunctions were not pushed through in a time-
pressured situation. The court also would have the chance to conduct an ex
post analysis of the bankruptcy process, rather than trying to guess whether or
not an injunction was essential to protect value.225
To avoid the administrative difficulties associated with all regimes that
attempt to allow certain credits, a policy regime could instead make trading
costly or make stopping trades costly. Pricing trades would acknowledge the
external costs that justify injunctions in the first place; pricing injunctions
would acknowledge the cost of halting trades. An injunction bond would
discourage frivolous injunctions and compensate parties harmed by trading
freezes, while a trading tax during Chapter 11 would discourage trading and
make a change in control less likely.
A mandatory injunction bond, which Judge Easterbrook proposed in UAL
Corp., would elegantly protect investors and encourage debtors to request
injunctions only when they are justified. It is also not a novel idea: judges
commonly require injunction bonds, including in bankruptcy cases.226 In fact,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instruct federal judges to require such
bonds in some contexts.227 In bankruptcy, injunction bonds would force a
223. Note, however, that this proposal creates a double standard by including only
bankruptcy cases. Corporations outside of bankruptcy would not have the opportunity to demonstrate
that they deserved to keep carryovers after a change in ownership. Of course, corporations currently
have the opportunity to freeze trading to prevent a change in ownership only in Chapter 11. Thus, to
some extent, the same double standard already exists.
224. As mentioned, almost all judges choose the former option. See supra
Introduction, Part III.A.2.
225. One problem with this proposal is that no party to the bankruptcy case would
have any reason to oppose the reinstatement of carryovers after reorganization. While the proposal
strives to allow situation-specific approval of tax credits, it could effect universal approval in practice.
Making carryovers bulletproof would be directly contrary to the policy goals the solution was designed
to achieve. To solve this dilemma, the IRS could review bankruptcy cases involving carryovers and
decide to contest reinstatement if it seemed suspect. For this to work, the bankruptcy judge would have
to invite the IRS to participate in the hearing: the IRS is not otherwise a party to the case, but the
hearing would not be adversarial without its participation. This would raise the same concerns with
administrative burden as the previous solution; however, the burden would be smaller since only
bankruptcy cases would be involved.
226. See, e.g., President Casinos, Inc. v. Columbia Sussex Corp. (In re President
Casinos, Inc.), 360 B.R. 262 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2007). Bonds are strikingly rare in cases producing
published opinions on trading injunctions.




debtor to put its money where its mouth is,228 reducing the likelihood that the
debtor would use an injunction for coercive or abusive purposes. If the costs of
a trading freeze were truly low-as debtors usually claim-a debtor would
want to prove this to minimize the cost of the bond. If the cost of a trading
freeze were likely to be higher than the benefit of preserving carryovers, a
debtor would not be willing to pay the high cost of the bond. These incentives
would encourage injunctions only when a trading freeze would create an
overall surplus, and the parties would share this gain: tax credits would remain,
and investors would either see their securities increase in value or receive
compensation from the bond.2 29
Bonds thus represent a vast improvement over the current practice, under
which investors bear substantial costs.230 Bonds are not entirely satisfying from
a policy standpoint, however. Fundamental concerns remain when carryovers
survive reorganization. The hope that debtors will request injunctions only
when carryovers are actually likely to have value lessens policy problems but
does not eliminate them: as extensively discussed, a reorganized firm can use
carryovers to offset significant gains that do not result from the initial losses.
Furthermore, management's massive informational advantage might allow it to
get away with smaller-than-necessary bonds. It would be difficult for anyone to
evaluate or challenge management's assessment of the costs and benefits of an
injunction, particularly if the injunction request were part of a package of first-
day motions.
Trading taxes should appeal even to someone who buys none of this
Note's skepticism about the motives and policy benefits of injunctions in
Chapter 11. It is uncontroversial that trading freezes injure stockholders.231
Any approach that allows trading, therefore, is desirable. Taxation of trades
would cause buyers and sellers to internalize some of the costs of their trades.
Tax revenue could be placed in a fund to compensate the debtor if the trading
did cause carryovers to be forfeited. This is essentially a reverse of the
injunction-bond approach: while the injunction bond would forbid trading and
require the debtor to compensate investors for their loss of liquidity, trading
taxes would allow trading but require parties who trade to compensate the
debtor for the costs of trading.
228. This bond should combat management's agency problem by providing a market
check: the debtor-in-possession lender will finance the bond only if the lender believes that the
reorganization will produce a profitable corporation.
229. Of course, it is likely that the value of a corporation's stock would increase if a
trading freeze were beneficial, since this would probably mean that the corporation is expected to
generate large profits after reorganization. Bonds thus might not significantly alter the situation in
which injunctions are actually beneficial. Their principal value would be as a deterrent for frivolous
injunctions and as protection for investors if stock prices were to decline (which would likely indicate
that the injunction was a mistake).
230. See supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., In re UAL Corp., 412 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2005) (describing the manner
and extent of the costs of trading freezes to investors).
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The problem with the tax solution-in addition to the fundamental
concerns surrounding any policy that allows reorganized corporations to
maintain carryovers-is that it would be difficult to determine the right amount
of tax. One of the main causes of the entire carryover dilemma is that
carryovers' value is uncertain. It therefore would be difficult to calculate the
appropriate tax to impose on buyers and sellers based on the risk of a change in
ownership that heir trades create. If an effective method could be created for
estimating the right tax, however, this solution might be preferable to
injunction bonds since it avoids the efficiency costs of a trading freeze.
Conclusion
The policy goal that best justifies NOL carryovers-remedying the
arbitrariness of the annual tax year system-is challenging to pursue in
practice. Both inside and outside of bankruptcy, it is difficult to confine the
application of carryovers to profits that result from the project that produced
the original losses. Congress's attempt to do this-by limiting the value of
carryovers after a change in control to the value of the corporation before the
change in control 23 2 -is laudable from a policy perspective. In practice,
however, it is difficult to apply. In the bankruptcy context, Congress
deliberately allowed an end-run around this provision, permitting corporations
that reorganize to retain carryovers despite a change in control. This end-run
often divorces carryover credits from the losses that produced them.
This separation permits carryovers to offset gains from reorganization,
producing perverse incentives and undermining the rationale for injunctions to
protect carryovers. Furthermore, the draconian results and unclear benefits of
trading freezes demand a new approach. The dangers of trading freezes do not
stop at their harsh consequences for investors. Injunctions also enable
managers to prevent takeovers in order to remain in power. To fix this
problem, judges must first depart from the status quo: the routine and
indiscriminate use of first-day trading injunctions needs to end. Various
policies could take injunctions' place: Congress could reform the 1986 Act's
special rules for bankruptcy or new rules could limit corporations' ability to
use NOLs. Alternatively, judges could simply stop issuing injunctions to
protect NOLs.
None of these solutions offers a perfect fix for the deeply flawed Chapter
11 carryover regime. Each approach, however, addresses important problems
with the current system. These are problems that demand attention. For
Chapter 11 bankruptcy to achieve its objectives, it must be a forum in which
parties have the opportunity to negotiate on an even playing field to allocate
assets and devise a plan to restructure a troubled corporation. Bankruptcy
232. This value is multiplied by the long-term, tax-exempt rate on government




courts also must protect debtor assets from threats caused by collective-action
problems. Any attempt to protect assets, however, should be carefully tailored,
strongly justified, and fairly implemented. If courts hand parties weapons that
can be used to hijack negotiations and coerce adversaries, reorganization
disintegrates into repression.
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